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AN ETHOS OF CONTROVERSIES: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTIVE 
LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
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Abstract 
In this article, the interactive approach to law is critically analysed. The 
development of this approach finds its roots in both theoretical perspectives and 
legal paradigm developments. Addressing issues such as animal biotechnology: 
issues that are characterised by uncertainties, rapid changes, and moral 
controversies, require a more interactive legal paradigm so that norm 
development can respond to developments in society. The interactive legislative 
approach’s basic elements include legal decision-making on a horizontal level 
(communication) and ongoing legal norm development in interaction with the 
specific field and society (responsiveness). Both elements strongly depend on a 
consensus-orientated way of thinking. To start, striving for consensus brings 
parties together by creating an arena in which parties are willing to co-operate. At 
the same time striving for consensus can justify the openness and flexibility of 
norms that are in need for further development. However, in this article, it is 
shown that for the interactive legislative approach’s functioning in practice, a 
consensus-orientated way of thinking instead seems counterproductive. In 
furtherance of the argument, the results based on a twofold case-study concerning 
the regulation of animal biotechnology in Switzerland and the Netherlands are 
used It is argued that due to a strong focus on consensus within these processes of 
legal norm development, legal practice faces difficulties stimulating an ongoing 
process of legal norm development which ensures the flexibility of legal norms. 
Instead of focusing on consensus, the author suggests legislators should follow an 
ethos of controversies. The latter contains a way of normative thinking in which 
the controversies are of main focus. 
Keywords 
Interaction; responsiveness; consensus; controversies; regulating moral issues; 
animal biotechnology 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I will present a critical analysis of the interactive approach to 
legislation. This approach finds its roots in both theoretical perspectives of law 
and in legal paradigm developments in practice. From a practical perspective, a 
switch towards a more interactive legal paradigm can be seen when addressing 
issues such as animal biotechnology: issues that are characterised by 
uncertainties, rapid changes, and moral controversies. These issues require greater 
norm flexibility. From a theoretical perspective the interactive approach can be 
understood in similar vein to ideas on responsiveness and communicative 
approaches to law. The interactive legislative approach’s basic elements include 
legal decision-making on a horizontal level (communication) and ongoing legal 
norm development in interaction with the specific field and society 
(responsiveness). The first element, horizontal decision-making, can best be 
explained as a method of decision- making in which actors in the field are 
approached as being co-producers of legal norms. The second element, ongoing 
legal norm development, requires norm flexibility, giving room for continuous 
adaptation in response to development of the norms in the field within which it 
intends to regulate. The functioning of both elements strongly depends on a 
consensus-orientated way of thinking. Striving for consensus can first of all bring 
parties together by creating an arena in which parties are willing to co-operate. 
Second, striving for consensus can justify the openness and flexibility of norms 
that are in need for further development.  
 In this article, I criticise the interactive legislative approach’s functioning in 
practice, as far as it concerns the ongoing norm development. I argue that due to a 
strong focus on consensus within these processes of legal norm development, 
legal practice faces difficulties stimulating an ongoing process of legal norm 
development which ensures the flexibility of legal norms. In furtherance of my 
argument, I use results based on a twofold case-study concerning the regulation 
of animal biotechnology in Switzerland and the Netherlands. Instead of focusing 
on consensus, I suggest legislators should follow an ethos of controversies. The 
latter contains a way of normative thinking in which the controversies are of main 
focus. 
 In Section B, I explain the basic tenets of the interactive legislative approach. 
In the first subsection, I introduce and describe the main concepts and 
fundamental building blocks of the interactive approach. In the second 
subsection, I describe the consideration concerning the interactive approach from 
a more practical perspective. I do so by introducing the relevant case studies and 
their characteristic elements. Section C focuses on my critique against consensus-
thinking as a way of stimulating and structuring legal norm development. This 
critique is illustrated by means of the outcome of the case studies mentioned 
earlier. In addition, I offer some theoretical reflection regarding such critique. In 
Section D, I discuss the ethos of controversies and further elaborate on the 
outcome of the case studies. Section E concludes with some remaining remarks 
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concerning the difficulties and implications of the ethos of controversies for legal 
practice. 
B. THE INTERACTIVE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
1. The Theoretical Perspective 
The interactive legislative approach can be understood as one of the models 
within a broader movement towards more communicative approaches to law.1 
Other examples of communicative approaches are responsive regulation, really 
responsive regulation, communicative law, and communicative style legislation.2 
These communicative approaches to law share a common interest in the role of 
communication processes in the development and implementation of legal norms 
which are all orientated to ideas of Selznick on responsiveness and of Fuller on 
interactionism.  
 Selznick’s responsive law approach focuses on dialogue instead of forced 
acceptance of the rules. Legislation developed through dialogue with society 
responds to the social needs and aspirations of society.3 Selznick therefore argues 
that rule-making should focus on the problem itself instead of following formal 
rules for guaranteeing the validity of norms.  
 Fuller analyses the relationship between reciprocity and legislation in his 
paper ‘Human Interaction and the Law’.4 The paper’s central question is whether 
the existence of law depends on a responsible interaction between legislature and 
subject. The assumption that legal practice finds its basis and justification 
ultimately in human interaction underlies this question. Fuller argues for the 
principles of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘co-operative effort’ should be strictly observed in 
order to ensure an effective legal order.5  
 Two characteristics of human associations, in general, enable a responsive 
interaction between actors in the field and the lawgiver. First of all, associations 
must be dominated by a principle of shared commitment which results in co-
operation. Second, associations have to be dominated by legal principles based on 
reciprocity. The principle of shared commitment can best be explained in terms of 
                                                            
1 W. van der Burg and F.W.A. Brom, ‘Legislation on Ethical Issues: Towards an Interactive 
Paradigm’ (2000) 3(1) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 57; J. Brunnee and S.J. Toope, 
‘Interactional International Law’ (2001) 3(3) International Law Forum 186. 
2 See e.g. B.M. J. van Klink and W.J. Witteveen, ‘Why is Soft Law Really Law?’ (1999) 3 RegelMaat 
120; J. Black and R. Baldwin, ‘Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation’ (2010) 32(2) Law and 
Policy 181. 
3 P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (Transaction 
Publishers 2001) 14. 
4 L.L. Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’ (1969) 14 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1. 
5 L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1964) 39–40.  
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a search for common ends or purposes, as the legal principle ‘refers to the 
situation where an association is held together and enabled to function by formal 
rules’.6  
 The principle of reciprocity implies a citizen’s duty to follow the rules,7 which 
can be traced back to the morality of duty. Fuller also distinguishes a morality of 
aspiration which relates to values which people cherish. Aspiration does not 
provide a good basis for legal rules, but this morality is relevant for responsible 
interaction between lawgiver and subject that may finally lead to a legal order. 
This morality is a guideline for action. In the communicative approaches, norm 
development additionally follows a morality of aspiration. 
 Witteveen and Van Klink claim that ‘the communicative style of legislation 
involves a continuing two-way effort, both from the legislator and (part of) the 
community’.8 As with Selznick’s responsive law, this communicative style of 
legislation recognises the purpose of the law translated into values in a more 
general sense. The legislature sets out one or more fundamental values that are 
considered essential in the community. Here, we can recognise the reciprocal 
nature of the relation between legislature and subject. The legislature lays down 
legal (open) norms that represent values cherished by society and consequently 
communicates with citizens about the extent of these values.9 At the same time, 
the legislature carefully weighs citizens’ ideas and concerns to come up with a 
good understanding from which to build a consensus about these shared values.  
 Baldwin and Black start from Selznick’s responsive law by developing a 
concept of ‘really responsive regulation’. They address questions concerning non-
compliance. Responsiveness will contribute to compliance of rules. However, to 
be responsive, the regulator should not only respond to the individual preferences 
and concerns of the citizens. Additionally, the regulator should respond to the 
mindset in which these individuals operate, the broader institutional environment, 
the different logistics of regulatory tools and strategies, the regime’s own 
performance, and to changes in the foregoing elements. It is suggested that, only 
then, will the party being subject to regulation commit to the rules.10 Furthermore, 
merely focussing on the personal preferences of the people does not do justice to 
all aspects of regulatory activity. Consequently, such a regulation will face 
difficulties concerning compliance.  
 The interpretation of the role of the legislature according to the interactive 
legislative approach implies an additional prominent role for Fuller’s ‘co-
operative effort’ between legislature and citizen, instead of emphasising the 
                                                            
6 L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1964) 71. 
7 ibid. 72–73. 
8 B.M. J. van Klink and W.J. Witteveen, ‘Why is Soft Law Really Law?’ (1999) 3 RegelMaat 120, 
127.  
9 B.M. J. Van Klink, De wet als symbol: Over wettelijke communicatie en de Wet gelijke behandeling 
van mannen en vrouwen bij de arbeid (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1998) 101–108. 
10 R. Baldwin and J. Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 27(1) Modern Law Review 69. 
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reciprocal nature of communication. The interactive approach’s emphasis on 
similar ideas, such as the notion of Fuller’s co-operative effort, explicitly 
highlights a shift within the communicative approaches to law from the vertical 
relation of conditioned self-regulation towards a horizontal level of interaction. It 
is largely for this reason, therefore, that this particular approach is studied in the 
research. Such an interpretation of interaction breaks through traditional 
paradigms. Similar developments can be noticed in scholarly debates among 
international law theorists in which the interactional model of international law is 
gaining popularity as a method to both establish an international legal system and 
international legal norms. The horizontal level of interaction on the basis of co-
operative effort is an attractive model for state-transcending issues.11  
 The interactive legislative approach as stressed by Van der Burg and Brom 
followed the line of thought that focuses on norm-development processes, in 
which the legal texts are a phase and not the end. Communication finds place on a 
more horizontal level and is, then, primarily built on interplay between the 
principle of reciprocity and co-operative effort.  
 Two main theses of this approach are: 
 
Thesis 1: The process of legislation on ethical issues is structured as a process 
of interaction between the legislature and society or relevant sectors of 
society, so that the development of new moral norms and the development of 
new legal norms may reinforce each other. 
 
Thesis 2: Legislation on ethical issues is designed in such a way that it is an 
effective form of communication and that, moreover, it facilitates an ongoing 
moral debate and ongoing reflection on those issues because this is the best 
method to ensure that the practice remains oriented to the ideal and values the 
law tries to realise.12 
 
 As the interactive approach, both follow a practical and a theoretical 
perspective, these theses have both normative and descriptive claims. On the one 
hand, the theorists argue that these theses describe the new developments in legal 
practice; on the other they claim the elements of the approach should be followed 
to stimulate communication and flexibility.13  
                                                            
11 J. Brunnee and S.J. Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an International 
Theory of International Law’ (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43. Although 
Brunnee and Toope do not explicitly refer to an interactive model of decision-making, earlier roots 
can be found in the transnational legal process as described by Koh in the 1994 Roscoe Pound lecture. 
Koh follows similar claims on the value of interaction, especially for its dynamic and normative 
features, see H.H. Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181, 184. 
12 W. van der Burg and F.W.A. Brom, ‘Legislation on Ethical Issues: Towards an Interactive 
Paradigm’ (2000) 3(1) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 57. 
13 ibid. 
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 Following first these two theses, it can be said that within this model of the 
interactive legislative approach, both a dynamic process and an interactive 
process of norm development is required. Interaction is understood as a process 
of communication on a horizontal level that requires the involvement of various 
social actors in decision-making. Here we can recognise elements of Fullers 
ideas. A dynamic process reflects the ongoing process of norm development 
which is still organised as an interactive process. In Selznick’s’ words, the process 
should be responsive. After a deeper exploration of the model, I have identified 
the following elements: the use of open norms and the search for consensus.14 
Open norms are the interactive legislative approach’s response to complex moral 
issues.15 It is the lack of consensus on moral values or the existence of conflicting 
moral values that implies a need for open norms. Consequently, moral values play 
a prominent role in all stages of the exploration and ongoing development of 
these open norms. Ensuring moral debate in all stages of norm development 
implies both an explicit inclusion of moral (controversial) values in these stages 
and a reflection upon these moral values within these stages.  
 To ensure a continuing debate on norm development, consensus is considered 
to be one of the goals. Moral consensus among social actors is not presupposed 
but it is argued that a constructive interaction in this dynamic process is more 
likely to result in consensus.16 At the same time, the idea of possible consensus or 
an interpretation of a (temporary) decision as if it was consensus will stimulate 
this constructive interaction.17  
 In the next Section, I will introduce the case-studies in which I address both 
theoretical and the practical assumptions. Can the model describe legal practice 
and can the elements of the approach lead to the main aims of communication and 
flexibility that the approach wishes to stimulate? 
2. The Practical Perspective 
As mentioned in the previous Section, the interactive approach’s proponents 
follow both a theoretical and a practical perspective. I have already explained the 
theoretical perspective. In this Section, the practical perspective is outlined. The 
practical perspective derives from the proponents’ claims concerning 
                                                            
14 These elements are not only characteristic for the interactive approach, these are characteristic for 
communicative approaches in general. See e.g. B.M. J. van Klink and W.J. Witteveen, ‘Why is Soft 
Law Really Law?’ (1999) 3 RegelMaat 120. 
15 W. van der Burg, ‘The Irony of a Symbolic Crusade: The Debate on Opening Up Civil Marriage for 
Same-Sex Couples’ in N. Zeegers, W. Witteveen and B.M.J. van Klink (eds.), Social and Symbolic 
Effects of Legislation Under the Rule of Law (The Edwin Mellen Press 2005).  
16 Following Habermas in his idea of the ‘ideal speech situation’, see J. Habermas, T. Burger (tr.) and 
F. Lawrence (tr.), Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (MIT Press 1989). 
17 W. van der Burg and F.W.A. Brom, ‘Legislation on Ethical Issues: Towards an Interactive 
Paradigm’ (2000) 3(1) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 57. 
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developments in legal practice. There is a growing interest for alternative 
approaches to law, especially concerning issues that are complex and have a 
strong moral impact. 18An example of such an issue is animal biotechnology 
which is a ‘new biology’ that refers to gene technology. In this application, 
knowledge of the structure of genetics is applied to influence and direct biological 
processes. An example of animal biotechnological procedures can be found in the 
use of so-called knock-out mice. Genes are responsible for the production of 
proteins which influence the functioning of the body. To understand which gene is 
responsible for the production of a specific kind of protein and thus indirectly for 
a specific function of the body, tests are done with knock-out or transgenic mice. 
In the embryos of mice, cells are implanted in which a certain gene is knocked 
out or changed in order to see what the function of that gene is.19 With these 
biotechnological procedures the researchers will gain insight into hereditary 
diseases. Additionally, these procedures are used for biomedical research about 
cancer. For the interest of human beings, these tests can contribute to a better 
treatment of these diseases. However, these mice will become ill with either 
cancer or hereditary diseases and eventually die. At the same time, due to gene 
technology these mice are more suitable for these tests and consequently, fewer 
animals are required. A contra-argument would posit against a further 
instrumental use of animals for the benefit of human beings. At the same time, 
researchers cannot foresee all consequences of the biotechnological procedures 
for both animals and mankind.  
 Due to the rapid developments in technology, the uncertainties concerning 
consequences of this technology and its strong moral impact, this issue requires 
control and at the same time flexibility. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, by 
regulating animal biotechnology, these complexities are acknowledged and a 
solution is sought in a more interactive approach.20  
                                                            
18 W. van der Burg and F.W.A. Brom, ‘Legislation on Ethical Issues: Towards an Interactive 
Paradigm’ (2000) 3(1) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 57; J. Brunnee and S.J. Toope, Legitimacy 
and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
19 The procedures are much more complex as I explain here, the cells need to be activated and the 
production of proteins is visualized by injecting fluorescing material. For more information, see CBD, 
CCMO and COGEM, Trendanalyse Biotechnology 2004 (COGEM 2004); see also the Kennislink 
website at <http://www.kennislink.nl> accessed 16 May 2012. 
20 S. Grotefeld, ‘Wie wird Moral ins Recht gesetzt?’ [2003] Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
299; W. van der Burg and F.W.A. Brom, ‘Legislation on Ethical Issues: Towards an Interactive 
Paradigm’ (2000) 3(1) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 57. Additionally, Denmark is an interesting 
case study for analysing the interactive legislative approach in general because of Danish experience 
in public consultation. Denmark is known for its methods of stimulating public debate and public 
involvement, for example through consensus referendums. Also in drafting the legislation on genetic 
modification and cloning of animals, these methods were utilized. It is therefore, that I have also 
studied the Danish case-study. However, for the sake of the argument I intend to make in this article, 
the Danish outcomes are less relevant. In Denmark, dynamics was not even stimulated. Consequently, 
conclusions concerning the difficulties that dynamics is facing in practice cannot be drawn from this 
case-study. The use of open norms and flexibility of norms does not fit the Danish roots in 
Scandinavian legal realism. Instead, most Danish legal practitioners as well as legal academics argue 
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 In Switzerland, the regulation of animal biotechnology is a result of two 
referenda in which the Swiss people could vote on the implementation of the 
principle of ‘dignity of living beings’ (Würde der Kreatur) in the Swiss 
constitution. This is a good example of the Swiss tradition of direct democracy. 
The Swiss government has also actively searched for methods to stimulate public 
debate concerning this matter. These referenda and the ensuing (parliamentary) 
debates resulted in the Gene Technology Law (hereafter: GTL), which came into 
force in 2003. This legislation provides for a licensing procedure for 
biotechnological procedures using animals under the auspices of the 
Biotechnology Section of the Federal Office for the Environment. Furthermore, 
an expert committee on biosafety and an ethics provide advice concerning 
licensing. The expert committee, the Swiss Federal Committee on Biosafety, 
advises on biosafety risks. The ethics committee, the Ethics Committee on Non-
Human Gene Technology (hereafter: ECNH) is appointed to advise the legislature 
on the ethical considerations on a case-by-case basis during the licensing 
procedure and on more general topics related to animal biotechnology. All their 
advice is open to the public.  
 In the Netherlands, animal biotechnology is regulated in the Animal Health 
and Welfare Act, which came into force in 1992. This Act merely creates a 
regulatory framework. Further rules concerning the licensing procedure involving 
animals are set forth in the Animal Biotechnology Decree, which came into force 
in 1997. This Decree, additionally, includes sections concerning the appointment 
of an ethics committee; the Ethics Committee on Animal Biotechnology 
(hereafter: the CAB).The CAB has already played a prominent role in the 
legislative process by co-producing the regulatory framework. The Decree 
assigns the CAB an important formal role in advising on the ethical concerns in 
licensing. Thereafter, The Minister formulates a draft decision based on the 
recommendations of the CAB. These draft decisions are open to public objection. 
After this public round, the Minister formulates a final decision.  
 As part of my research, I have analysed these regulations, their legislative 
procedures, and their functioning in practice to see whether they contain all 
elements of the interactive approach and, if so, whether this approach has led to 
the incentives of the interactive approach: communication on a horizontal level 
and flexibility of norms. 
 In both countries, I identified elements of communication on a horizontal 
level. In Switzerland, pre-parliamentary procedures left room for experts and 
individuals to comment on the draft-regulation. In particular, the ethics committee 
and experts on risks and gene technology were involved in designing the 
                                                                                                                                       
that adequate regulation consists of clear legal rules. This entails a relevant outcome of the broader 
research as it is for identifying conditions under which this approach might function adequately, 
however not for challenging the dynamic element.  
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framework.21 The Dutch legislative process of the regulation on animal 
biotechnology also consisted elements of horizontal communication. Actors from 
the relevant field and a committee of ethicists were involved in drafting the law 
and designing the set of criteria that were used in the licensing procedure.22 
Licensing decisions are open to public objection. The Minister is then obliged to 
organise licensing hearings in which the public can explain their objection. This 
procedure reveals a strong public participation.  
 The dynamics of the legal framework which was intended to stimulate 
flexibility of norms was less present in both countries. In both Switzerland and 
the Netherlands the legislature aimed for establishing an ongoing process of norm 
development.23 In both countries it is recognised that development of legal norms 
will be more satisfactory if these interact with developments in the field. 
Consequently, both legislatures embedded open norms in the legal framework.24 
In Switzerland, the dignity of living beings needed to be taken into account in 
licensing and in the Netherlands, the legal framework included a norm enforcing 
ethical considerations to be taken into consideration during licensing. By a strong 
orientation towards consensus, both Swiss and Dutch legislature intended to 
concretise these norms into legal practice but failed in its attempt.  
 In Switzerland, norm development regarding the dignity of living beings 
stagnated prematurely. During the pre-parliamentary process, the ECNH 
formulated a definition in which dignity of living beings was explained as a 
gradual concept. Equally, the ECNH was aware that this definition was 
controversial and required further debate and challenging.25 Even with the 
remarks of the ECNH that this concept required further debate , the authority 
complied with principle only to the extent of applying this definition in the 
licensing procedure to the individual cases and setting standards for similar 
cases.26 Despite the urge for further consideration, this approach did not leave 
                                                            
21 Eidgenössisches Volkswirtschaftsdepartement, Bericht über die Ergebnisse des 
Vernehmlassungsverfahrens zum Vorentwurf der Gen-Lex-Vorlage (Bern 1998); ECNH, ‘Vorläufige 
Stellungnahme zur Gen-Lex-Vorlage’ (EKAH, September 1998) <http://www.ekah.admin.ch/ 
en/topics/dignity-of-living-beings/index.html> accessed 16 May 2012. 
22 Voorlopige Commissie Ethische Toetsing Genetische Modificatie van Dieren, Advies inzake het 
dossier ‘Weefselspecifieke expressie van genen in de melkklier van genetisch gemodificeerde 
runderen’ (LNV 1992); F.W.A. Brom et al., Het toetsen van biotechnologische handelingen bij 
dieren: Rapport van een commissie van externe deskundigen ten behoeve van de Commissie 
Biotechnologie bij Dieren (CBD 1996). 
23 C. Errass, Offentliches Recht der Gentechnologie im Ausserhumanbereich (Stämpfli Verlag AG 
Bern 2006) 114. 
24 ibid.; L.M. Poort, Consensus and Controversies: An Interactive Legislative Approach to Animal 
Biotechnology in Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Forthcoming, Eleven Publishers 2012) 
ch. 7. 
25 ECNH, ‘Vorläufige Stellungnahme zur Gen-Lex-Vorlage’ (EKAH, September 1998) 
<http://www.ekah.admin.ch/en/topics/dignity-of-living-beings/index.html> accessed 16 May 2012. 
26 L.M. Poort, Consensus and Controversies: An Interactive Legislative Approach to Animal 
Biotechnology in Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Forthcoming, Eleven Publishers 2012) 
99. It must be mentioned that the Swiss Ethics Committee on Non-Human Gene-technology (ECNH) 
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room for fundamental debate on the extent and meaning of the norms. That would 
have not been problematic if the definition of ‘dignity of living beings’ as being a 
gradual concept was agreed upon by all actors involved. An example seems to 
illustrate differently. Nevertheless, the ECNH’s statement about a license 
application for a field trial with primates by Zürich’s ETH in 2007 led to crucial 
debates.27 Both the ECNH’s own discussion and its response reflected 
fundamental disagreement on the interpretation of the definition of ‘dignity of 
living beings’. Especially theologians, raised fundamental criticism against 
dignity as a gradual concept. It was argued that it was not at all clear whether the 
interpretation of 'dignity of living beings’ as a gradual concept was justified in the 
first place or could be explained in the individual case. This shows that the 
ECNH’s interpretation was not based on consensus among the parties: indeed, 
parties were diametrically opposed to each other’s views. Neglecting fundamental 
criticism on the ‘gradual concept’ in the first place, would appear to have resulted 
in an escalation of the debate.28  
 Contrastingly, in the Netherlands, the CAB has to a certain extent concretised 
the open norms by setting some criteria and standards for application in 
individual cases.29Despite this, however, norm development actually stagnated 
(prematurely).  
The CAB’s deliberations were restricted to individual cases as they were limited 
by the legal context of the licensing procedure. In this procedure, the CAB had 
the task of commenting on the moral impact of the use of animals in that 
particular case rather than general concept of integrity of animals. This process 
has not resulted in a set of general standards concerning the moral acceptability of 
animal biotechnology, only in a set of concrete standards.30 In response to this 
lack of fundamental debate, the CAB initiated a series of broader debates on 
general themes concerning animal biotechnology.31 These meetings were partially 
                                                                                                                                       
has published a few statements presenting a more general reflection on the dignity of living beings. 
Furthermore, associated academics have contributed to defining and exploring the concept. However, 
these explorations have mostly been confined to academic debate on the extent of the gradual concept 
as it applies in particular cases, and have not addressed the fundamental substance of the concept 
itself. 
27 L.M. Poort, Interview with A. Willemsen, Secretary of the ECNH (Spring 2007). 
28 J. Fischer, ‘Haben Affen Würde?’ (Ethik-Zentrum, July 2007) <http://www.ethik.uzh.ch/ise/ 
publikationen/publikationen-1/HabenAffenWuerde.pdf> accessed July 2007. 
29 A. Meijer et al., Evaluatie van het Besluit Biotechnologie bij Dieren (USBO Advies 2005). 
30 L.E. Paula, Ethics Committees, Public Debate and Regulation: An Evaluation of Policy Instrument 
in Bioethics Governance (Athena Institute 2008). 
31 T. Visak and F. Meijboom, Integriteit van dieren: Bouwsteen of Struikelblok? Verslag van de eerste 
discussiebijeenkomst over biotechnologie bij dieren (Centre for Bioethics and Health Law 2002); T. 
Visak and F. Meijboom, Op zoek naar alternatieven – maar voor welke doelstelling? (Ethics Institute 
2003); T. Visak and F. Meijboom, Het maatschappelijk belang van een doelstelling: Zoeken naar 
goede argumenten – Verslag van de derde discussiebijeenkomst over biotechnologie bij dieren (Ethics 
Institute 2003); T. Visak and F. Meijboom, De waarde van een machtsvrije dialoog voor verdere 
verdieping: Verslag van de vierde discussiebijeenkomst over biotechnologie bij dieren (Ethics 
Institute 2004). 
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successful, as they drew new input. At the same time, however, the meetings did 
not stimulate an ongoing learning process regarding animal biotechnology as no 
new arguments were brought to bear.32  
 In the next Section, I argue that one of the explanations of these difficulties 
can be found in a strong strive for consensus. I will argue that striving for 
consensus risks counteracting ongoing norm development and flexibility.  
C. CONSENSUS 
1. An Ethos of Consensus 
An ethos of consensus is a way of thinking in legal practice that seeks to structure 
decision making processes around a search for consensus. It includes consensus 
as an ideal outcome, as well as a regulative ideal. The idea of consensus as an 
ideal outcome is derived from Habermas’ idea of the ideal speech situation. 
Habermas presents a normative theory of a procedural democracy in which the 
ideal political process is one that aims for consensus under ideal circumstances. 
Under ideal circumstances, all discussants can participate in debate with equal 
opportunity and equal power, and without any constraint. If all parties consent to 
an outcome at the end of this discussion, it should represent the ideal outcome.33  
 The second conception defines consensus as a regulative ideal. Consensus as a 
regulative ideal is a more dynamic concept. Here, consensus is not the ideal 
outcome of a political process, but rather an orienting aim. Proponents of 
consensus as a regulative ideal consider the outcome as less foundational for their 
decisions. They acknowledge that in legislative politics a consensus may never be 
reached. Instead, they emphasise the benefits of aiming for consensus as a method 
for structuring deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson, for example, do not 
consider aiming for consensus as an ideal outcome, but consider aiming for 
consensus only as a method of reducing disagreements and ensuring openness to 
other people’s viewpoints.34 Consensus, then, functions merely as a regulative 
ideal for rational debate in which discussants persuade using rational arguments. 
 Despite the differences between these concepts, their tendency to collapse 
onto one another means that they are best considered together as part of the same 
‘ethos of consensus’.  
                                                            
32 B. Bovenkerk and L.M. Poort, ‘The Role of Ethics Committees in Public Debate’ (2008) 22(1) 
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33 J. Habermas, T. Burger (tr.) and F. Lawrence (tr.), Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: 
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (MIT Press 1989); N. Rescher, Pluralism, Against 
the Demand for Consensus (Clarendon Press 1993) 190. 
34 A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Harvard University Press 1996).  
46 Poort 
Legisprudence, Vol. 6, No. 1 
 An ethos of consensus was present in both case study countries, and had 
implications for the interactive legislative process in each of them. In 
Switzerland, consensus was considered as both an end and a starting point for 
norm development. This perception of consensus becomes most apparent in the 
development of the concept of dignity of living beings. This concept played an 
important role in regulating animal biotechnology since it was one of the 
incentives to call for regulation in the first place. At the beginning of the 
legislative process, there was no consensus on the concept of ‘dignity of living 
beings’.35 Actors agreed on the importance of the concept, but not on its meaning. 
The ECNH emphasised the need for further elaboration, as it made clear that not 
all members were agreed on the preliminary conceptualisations.36 In that sense, 
consensus was considered a regulative ideal. A search for consensus was, 
therefore supposed to structure norm development.  
 Nevertheless, the gradual conception of dignity of living beings was presented 
as if based on a consensus, and it functioned as a basis for the regulatory 
framework.37 The responsible authorities adopted and applied the ECNH’s 
interpretation of the concept without further questioning its meaning. The 
preliminary conceptualisations started to function as an end, the ideal outcome. In 
general, ECNH’s policy statements are presented as being based on consensus, 
even if not consented to by all of its members. Interestingly, this concept started 
to function as if it were based on consensus.38 In other words, as if the concept 
was the ideal outcome. As seen in the previous Section, the strong drive for 
consensus during norm development resulted in constructing ‘dignity of living 
beings’ as a gradual concept. Further debate on ‘dignity of living beings’ was 
restricted to crystallizing the gradual concept. The concept itself was not further 
questioned. There was no need for further fundamental debate on the gradual 
concept since the ideal outcome had already been reached. In reality, however, 
this consensus was superficial and many divergences still existed.39 Rather than 
establishing dialectic, the connection between consensus as a starting-point, 
consensus as an ideal outcome, and consensus as a regulative ideal seem to have 
counteracted further development. 
 In the Netherlands, during the legislative process, it was emphasised that no 
consensus yet existed concerning the extent and meaning of the intrinsic value of 
                                                            
35 ECNH, ‘Vorläufige Stellungnahme zur Gen-Lex-Vorlage’ (EKAH, September 1998) 
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36 ibid. 
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animals.40 The legislature stated that this concept needed further development but 
should be included in the legal framework as an aspiration. The concept of 
intrinsic value of animals could thereby guide the process of deepening and 
strengthening the moral status of animals. A search for consensus was regarded as 
one of the mechanisms that would structure and actively stimulate further norm 
development.41  
 To a certain extent, the process led to further crystallisation of norms. In the 
evaluation of the CAB it became clear that about 90 per cent of its 
recommendations were based on a unanimous decision. Furthermore, the CAB 
was able to establish ‘substantial’ consensus on applications regarding a variety 
of research.42 In many issues, the CAB reached consensus on both the problem 
definition and its solutions. It seems that processes of fact-finding in the 
individual cases contributed to the development of a set of well-functioning 
practical standards,43 and concrete norms.44  
 However, norm development on a higher aggregation level has not been 
established. One explanation is possibly the role of the CAB. Despite its official 
advisory role, in reality, the CAB has a decisive role. The Minister draws up a 
draft decision based on the recommendations of the CAB. The draft decisions are 
open for public comment. These objections can be clarified during a public 
hearing chaired by the CAB. Thereafter, it and advises the Minister after giving 
due consideration to public comment. Officially, the Minister should then decide 
on licensing. However, in reality, the Minister adopts the advice of the CAB. The 
practice of licensing has evolved into a more decisive role of the CAB. A decisive 
role seems to bring in other responsibilities. As the Minister adopted the CABs 
advices, the CAB also took the legal consequences into account.45 In other words, 
their context of advising on moral concerns became, indirectly, a legal one. 
Consequently, the CAB’s reasoning received undue emphasis in the legal 
decisions and by so doing the CAB’s role of advice developed into one of 
influence. Further norm development on integrity or fundamental debate on the 
moral status was unnecessary since consensus on the standards has already been 
reached. In other words, the ideal outcome had already been reached. Consensus 
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on the legal level in concrete cases seems to have downplayed the urge for 
fundamental debate in a broader context.46  
 In Switzerland and the Netherlands, norm development was restricted to 
developing legal standards that were easily applicable in licensing practice. The 
norms were not further concretised or developed to a higher aggregation level. 
The minimum definitions were adopted without further challenge. These 
definitions were treated as if they were based on a consensus. Their content was 
consequently supposed to be justified and consequently left alone.  
 In Dutch and Swiss legislative practice, the presence of an ethos of consensus 
seems to have led to the premature stagnation of norm development. Temporary 
political achievements were no longer contested, even when it was clear that they 
required further development. The ethos of consensus undermined the 
possibilities for dynamic norm development and did not act as stimulation for 
further debate. 
 These examples illustrate the limits of aiming for consensus i.e. consensus as 
regulative ideal. Aiming for consensus may, to a certain extent, structure debate 
and ensure positive attitudes towards decision-making processes and their 
outcomes. The common focus on reaching consensus in a particular case will 
often lead actors in the same direction. At the same time, however, the search for 
consensus seems to idealise this willingness to co-operate and assume it will 
automatically lead to rational debate or a further crystallisation of norms. 
Willingness to co-operate does not imply that all parties consent on how to reach 
a common end. During the norm development process, differences in problem-
definition, on the direction in which a discussion should move, as well as on new 
controversies can be brought to light. Furthermore, aiming for consensus runs the 
risk of excluding controversies or differences. Actors who do not accept the 
problem-definition or the direction of the discussion may risk exclusion from the 
process. The previously mentioned Swiss primate case exemplifies this risk. The 
ECNH interpreted dignity of living beings as a gradual concept. Licensing 
standards relied upon this conception. However, discussions concerning 
particularly controversial license applications involving biotechnological 
procedures with primates revealed that not all actors had consented to the gradual 
concept. During the legislative process, the lack of consensus on the definition of 
‘dignity of living beings’ did not seem problematic, as the temporary status of the 
definition was emphasised. However, in licensing practice, dissenting concerns 
and viewpoints were not re-introduced. The fiction of consensus on the gradual 
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status of animals in light of animal biotechnology. According to the Minister, the amount of 
unanimous decisions made clear that the moral status has been crystallized. The members of the CAB 
question this conclusion. The chairman stated that even though they have reached unanimous 
decisions and substantial consensus on several biotechnological procedures with animals, the moral 
status requires further debate, see L.M. Poort, Interview with E. Schroten and S. Beukema (Spring 
2009). 
Ethos of Controversies 49 
Legisprudence, Vol. 6, No. 1 
concept masked the fact that parties were still diametrically opposed, which 
resulted in heated debates. 
 It is, thus, doubtful whether positive attitudes still exist at the end of debate. 
The excluded are no longer involved in development of the norms. Aiming for 
consensus leads to exclusion of groups that may jeopardise the possibility of 
reaching consensus. Open and positive attitudes towards decision making are 
more difficult to sustain if dissenters feel that they are not taken seriously or if 
they have no space to challenge decisions. According to Honig, these groups will 
eventually withdraw from decision making and radicalise.47 Furthermore, 
exclusion undermines the rationality of debate, which, in consensus theory, is 
built on equal power and equal opportunity.48  
 An example of this can be found in the Dutch licensing procedure. In public 
hearings about licensing, questions about the moral acceptability of animal 
biotechnology were put aside with a simple ‘this is not the forum for asking these 
questions’. The CAB sidelined arguments that went beyond their context of 
interpretation. The public did not have equal opportunity or equal power to 
express their concerns since the CAB did not respond to their objections using 
rational arguments. 
 Aiming for consensus tends to exclude viewpoints. Consequently, an ethos of 
consensus would appear to be an undesirable not a feature in an interactive 
legislative process aiming for an ongoing process of norm development. Focusing 
on consensus tends to downplay the complexity of difficult issues. According to 
Rawls, the exclusion of viewpoints is the price we pay for addressing 
fundamental political questions. He argues that although it may be unfair to 
restrain ourselves and others from using non-neutral arguments, it is required for 
finding a solution that is acceptable to everyone in a pluralistic society.49 
However, the necessity of finding a solution cannot justify the exclusion of 
viewpoints. Rather, as Van der Sluijs et al. argue in the context of environmental 
sustainability, there should be more space in debates for diversity and uncertainty 
in knowledge and views. As an example of this principle, Van der Sluijs et al. 
suggest that making room for dissent will help provide a better picture of the 
status of climate science. Without a good picture it is difficult to develop prudent 
policies.50 The exclusion of certain viewpoints without consideration therefore 
cannot be justified.51 In the same way, we cannot be convinced that a consensus 
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reflects ‘the ideal outcome’ if all possible viewpoints have not been incorporated. 
Besides, an outcome of debate is more valuable if its foundations have been 
explained and shared with others. Parties still doubting whether an outcome is the 
right answer for them may be, in that case, more willing to accept it.  
D. AN ETHOS OF CONTROVERSIES 
This Section explains the ethos of controversies, which will be presented as an 
alternative to the orientation toward consensus. This ethos structures decision-
making processes and norm development around an exploration of controversies. 
Additionally, the ethos of controversies emphasises the political nature of 
decisions that have been made by pinpointing where conflicts may still exist.  
 An ethos of controversies responds to the failures of an ethos of consensus in 
addressing complex issues with significant moral impact. For complex issues 
characterised by strong moral disagreements, such as animal biotechnology, legal 
and moral norms have not yet been crystallised. In other words, it seems that for 
these issues the current legal and ethical framework vocabulary runs short.52 It 
seems too premature to search for consensus. I will argue that instead a 
confrontation of viewpoints, concerns, and preferences – an ethos of 
controversies – can therefore help to stimulate further norm development for all 
such issues.  
 This Section starts with a subsection in which the circumstances of an ethos of 
controversies will be explored. Then, in the second subsection, the stages of the 
norm development process in which an ethos of controversies can operate will be 
highlighted.  
1. The Circumstances of an Ethos of Controversies 
I argue that an ethos of controversies should be applied when using an interactive 
legislative approach to regulate issues with strong moral impacts. To come to a 
better understanding of an ethos of controversies, we have to explain the 
circumstances it seeks to address.  
 The ethos of controversies corresponds to Waldron’s respect for disagreement; 
both are responses to similar political circumstances. Although decisions have to 
be made, awareness of unresolved moral conflict is important. As Waldron 
argues, this shows more respect for opinions which have been excluded from 
decisions. Waldron’s ‘circumstances of politics’ begins by explaining Rawls’ 
circumstances of justice. These circumstances are those aspects of the human 
condition that make justice necessary as a virtue and as a practice: moderate 
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scarcity and the limited altruism of individuals.53 According to Waldron, the 
circumstances of politics are developed along similar lines. There is a need for a 
common framework or course of action on some issues among members of a 
certain group. The need for common action, combined with a lack of agreement 
on what course of action to take or on the framework itself, defines the 
circumstances of politics.54 Animal biotechnology issues are characterised by a 
strong moral pluralism and rapid change. In particular, the intractable dimension 
of moral disagreements on issues such as animal biotechnology requires an ethos 
of controversies. This moral disagreement requires further elaboration since the 
various controversies that characterise the issue are still in development. Issues 
like these are difficult to address, because there is a current need for regulation 
despite strong moral disagreement. Such issues have a dimension of ongoing 
discourse that cannot be resolved by the explication of clear-cut decisions. At the 
same time, there is a need for controlling and guiding the development of these 
issues. As Van der Burg claims, ‘the most obvious institution for control is the 
law’.55 
 The need for a framework or course of action establishes a commonality for 
political discourse. Indeed, without a disagreement there would be no need for 
discussion in the first place.56 Furthermore, it is important to respect that 
disagreement may persist. Respecting disagreement, even when a decision has 
been made, can arguably, do more justice to the various viewpoints of 
individuals.57 As was clear in the Swiss primate case, ignoring different 
viewpoints eventually resulted in heated debates. When disagreements are 
recognised and respected, it is more likely that individuals will be willing to 
accept the decision that has been made, even if their own preferences or 
viewpoints are not reflected in the decision itself.  
 An ethos of controversies shares the agonists’ understanding of the conflicting 
nature of opinions in a pluralist democracy. Both underline that issues 
characterised by intractable moral disagreements involving a dimension of non 
resolvability. Agonists, however, merely argue against deliberative democratic 
theories. According to Mouffe, deliberative democrats seem to ignore the 
conflicting dimension of pluralism and therefore erase the essential 
‘undecidability’ of politics with a strong focus on consensus. Mouffe argues that 
the deliberative idea of commonality is in fact politically constituted. She refers 
to deliberative democrats who perceive outcomes as being the result of moral 
consensus and, according to her, consequently fail to ‘recognize the political 
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nature of its own exclusion’.58 On this last point, the concept of an ethos of 
controversies seems to cohere with agonistic ideas on politics. In legal politics, 
decisions have to be made. At the same time, it is necessary to recognise inherent 
lack of resolvability in the conflicting nature of pluralism.59 The recognition of 
conflict will do better justice to the conflicting aspect of pluralism and help to 
establish a legal discourse that is more realistic.60  
 In contrast to Mouffe’s ideas, however, an ethos of controversies retains a 
strong deliberative dimension, as this ethos insists on a dialogue between actors. 
Whereas agonists generally criticise deliberative democracy theory and its focus 
on deliberation as a basis for legitimacy, an ethos of controversies emanates from 
a critique against consensus as a regulative ideal. An ethos of controversies is a 
response to the failure of an ethos of consensus which the case studies showed to 
be insufficient in stimulating further norm development regarding complex issues 
with strong moral impacts. The presence of incommensurable values argues 
against consensus as a regulative ideal. However, this does not mean that an 
ongoing process of norm development is impossible. Even incommensurable 
values can be articulated and confronted with each other in a debate. An ethos of 
controversies still values interaction, which helps to ensure that norms are 
orientated to practice. 
 Following an ethos of controversies may not solve the conflict, but that is not 
what is or should be aimed for within the interactive legislative approach. This 
approach aims at finding a way to cope with – not necessarily resolve – complex 
issues with a strong moral impact. The interactive legislative approach should 
therefore start with a better understanding of the controversies.  
2. An Ethos of Controversies 
The ethos of controversies is designed to deal with issues that are characterised 
by controversial moral viewpoints. Instead of primarily aiming to bring 
controversial viewpoints closer together and come to an agreement, an ethos of 
controversies aims to do justice to the various viewpoints on an issue. An ethos of 
controversies presents a more realistic approach to the legal decision-making 
processes, as it takes into account their political nature.  
 The design of an ethos of controversies differs from that of an ethos of 
consensus. An ethos of consensus structures deliberation through a common focus 
on consensus that can eventually legitimate decisions.61 An ethos of controversies 
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focuses instead on problem-definition and on structuring norm development. The 
ethos of controversies operates in three stages.  
 First of all, a focus on the controversies of an issue means that the various 
viewpoints, concerns, and preferences must be articulated. A stocktaking of all 
these viewpoints, concerns, and preferences can contribute to problem-definition 
and may lead to a better understanding of the issue at stake.  
 Instead of focusing on the commonalities among the various viewpoints, an 
ethos of controversies structures the discussion around a focus on the differences, 
thereby providing insights into the conflict. Without an emphasis on the 
controversies, there is a risk that viewpoints will be ignored,62 disagreement will 
not be addressed and problem definitions will be simplified. In order to avoid 
these risks, an ethos of controversies encourages the recognition of the conflicting 
viewpoints by showing respect to all of them.63 A well-considered decision can 
only be made on the basis of a comprehensive description of the problem.64 A 
problem-definition focused on conflict is then a precondition for norm 
development and decision making since here the process of problem-definition, 
aims to explicate the various viewpoints, concerns, and preferences of all parties. 
Without sufficient problem-definition, gaps in understanding the issues at stake 
will infect the solutions to the problem, as people begin to follow and believe the 
incomplete definition of the problem.65  
 Second, debate in an ethos of controversies is built on confrontation among 
these various viewpoints, concerns, and preferences. Debate is structured around 
a confrontation that acknowledges differences in reasoning. This forces the 
various actors to explain, think through but to also reconsider their viewpoints. 
Viewpoints, concerns and preferences are no longer loose statements, as their 
reasons are explicated and can be discussed. Confrontation, consequently, should 
contribute to stimulating further norm development.  
 Nevertheless, in the end, decisions have to be made,66 and it would be less 
complicated to make these decisions if everyone agreed. However, as the case 
studies made clear, issues such as animal biotechnology have a dimension of 
undecidability. People express fundamental disagreements, especially with 
respect to the moral impact of these technologies. An ethos of controversies 
should not be understood as a decision-making method. It is difficult to legitimate 
decisions on the basis of an articulation and discussion of the controversies that 
characterise an issue. However, these controversies should at least have a role in 
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decision making. The third stage of an ethos of controversies is therefore 
awareness of the conflict that still exists after decisions have been made.  
 Of course, a remaining point of criticism could be that even with 
acknowledging that the moral conflict may still exist after decisions have been 
made, in the end, viewpoints are still excluded. Does an ethos of controversies 
may still involve a kind of window-dressing? I claim that it is not, as awareness 
of the conflict will contribute to acknowledging the political character of 
decisions. This acknowledgement in turn will contribute to stimulating a more 
open debate during further norm development. This should encourage flexibility 
toward decisions that have been made, as these decisions will be confronted by 
the conflicting viewpoints that still exist. Furthermore, even although a minority 
viewpoint is excluded from the current legal decision, its role in the moral debate 
is still there. This ensures minorities can keep and follow their own moral 
judgements.  
 The interplay between these three stages stimulates an ongoing process of 
norm development. Furthermore, by operating in these three stages, an ethos of 
controversies aims to do justice to individual opinions. As a result, it is likely that 
people will be more willing to accept and respect decisions, even where they may 
not reflect their own personal preferences and viewpoints.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The ethos of controversies responds to the failures of the dynamic character of the 
ideal-typical model of the interactive legislative approach. However, it could be 
asked how an ethos of controversies has to function in the regulatory practice? I 
consider there to be an important role for both legal institutions and advisory 
expert committees in this process.  
 If both legal institutions and ethics committees follow an ethos of 
controversies, ethics committees may feel less obliged or tempted to present a 
unanimous statement in order to increase their influence on decision making as 
we have seen in the Dutch case. By focusing on the conflictual dimension of 
decision making, ethics committees are not forced to come to moral judgment 
either legal judgment prematurely. 
 An ethos of controversies may, then, help to ensure that ethics committees’ 
input is taken seriously, and thus that legal and moral norm development can still 
interact. By foregrounding conflict, ethics committees may contribute to 
increasing awareness of the political nature of decisions in which moral values 
play a role. As a result, ethics committees are more likely to acknowledge that 
decision making does not necessarily reflect the settlement of the moral conflict.  
 However, the institutionalisation of ethics committees in a context of legal 
politics still risks the domination of the legalistic context in practical thinking. We 
should not underestimate the tendency of law to fall back on legalistic frames of 
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thinking. Presuming a role for ethics committees in bridging the gap between 
legal norm development and moral debate may still involve only a temporary 
successful interaction between moral and legal norm development. Ethics 
committees may still fall back to a focus on developing legal standards. An 
additional institution or method that could assist ethics committees in stimulating 
moral norm development may therefore be required. Further research is required 
into how to structure the ethos of controversies in current legal practice. 
Moreover, further research is required into how to prevent legal domination of 
moral norm development. 
 
